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6.1 Introduction
Close ties between banks and their borrowers are common in many less-
developed countries (LDCs). Indeed, in many LDCs these ties are so close
that banks lend primarily to ﬁrms controlled by their own directors, or
their directors’ close friends and families. The standard view among poli-
cymakers is that these arrangements are pernicious: they allow insiders
(bank directors) to expropriate outsiders (minority shareholders and de-
positors). The incentives to expropriate outsiders are likely to be particu-
larly strong during a ﬁnancial crisis, as the insiders seek to use the re-
sources of the bank to rescue their other enterprises.1 Related lending,
according to this view, is therefore “a manifestation of looting” (La Porta,
López-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa 2003, 231).
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2002; Habyarimana 2003; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa 2003.If related lending is so bad, then why did it characterize the banking sys-
tems of the United States, Germany, and Japan during their most rapid pe-
riods of growth?2 Indeed, as Kroszner and Strahan have shown, related
lending is still widespread in the United States, continental Europe, and
Japan (Kroszner and Strahan 2001). These ﬁndings suggest, in turn, that
there are conditions under which related lending is pernicious and condi-
tions under which it is not.
What might those conditions be? One might posit either of two hy-
potheses. The ﬁrst is that the impact of related lending varies with the qual-
ity of property rights. According to this view, related lending was (and is)
positive in the United States, continental Europe, and Japan because the
rule of law and eﬃciently speciﬁed property rights make looting diﬃcult.3
In developing countries, on the other hand, the lack of well-speciﬁed prop-
erty rights, coupled with the lack of rule of law, allows directors to loot
their banks with impunity. The second hypothesis is that the impact of re-
lated lending varies with the quality of corporate governance. This view
stresses that what determines the growth outcomes of related lending is the
presence (or absence) of institutions that lower the cost of monitoring
bank directors.4
We argue that the weight of the evidence supports the second view: the
outcome of related lending depends on the incentives and monitoring costs
faced by bank directors, minority shareholders, and depositors. Our view
is motivated by several curious features of what is perhaps the most inten-
sively studied case of looting through related lending: Mexico from 1995 to
1998. During this period, bank directors made loans to the ﬁrms in which
they held an interest that had lower levels of collateralization, lower in-
terest rates, and higher default rates than arm’s-length loans (La Porta,
López-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa 2003). The ﬁrst curious feature of this
episode is that it took place in the context of an ongoing taxpayer-ﬁnanced
bailout of depositors, bank debtors, and stockholders.5 The second odd
feature of the 1995–1998 banking crisis is that the directors of Mexico’s
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2. See Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard 1994; Lamoreaux 1994; Calomiris 1995; Fohlin 1998.
3. For example, looting via default on existing debt will be more diﬃcult in countries where
bankruptcy law allows creditors to replace the management of bankrupt companies.
4. The term corporate governance is often used to capture two conceptually separate issues.
It sometimes refers to the general enforcement of property rights. At other times, it refers to
the institutions that allow shareholders and directors to monitor one another. We use the term
in its second sense. Indeed, the institutions that allow shareholders and directors to monitor
each other are important precisely because the agency problems between residual claimants
(like depositors, shareholders, and directors) rise along with the cost of information and the
diﬃculty of using the state to enforce property rights.
5. From 1991 to 1995, Mexico’s banks were characterized by extremely high levels of loan
default and negative real rates of return on assets. In early 1995 the Mexican government car-
ried out a bailout designed to protect depositors. This bailout was originally intended as a
one-time event, but it quickly became an open-ended mechanism that not only protected de-
positors but protected bank debtors and bank shareholders as well (Haber 2005).banks had very little of their own capital at risk well before the crisis began.
When Mexico privatized its banking system in 1991, the new owners bor-
rowed much of the capital they used to purchase the banks from the very
same banks they were purchasing. Many of the banks, therefore, eﬀectively
had capital-adequacy ratios close to zero well before they ran into trouble
(Mackey 1999). In other words, neither depositors nor shareholders had
any incentive to monitor the activities of the bank directors, and the direc-
tors had no incentives to monitor each other. In short, both property rights
and corporate governance were poor in Mexico’s 1995–1998 episode,
which greatly limits its utility in adjudicating between the competing hy-
potheses.
We assess these two hypotheses by exploring the causes and conse-
quences of related lending in a case in which there was widespread related
lending, an externally generated ﬁnancial shock that occasioned a gov-
ernment-organized rescue of the banks, weakly enforced property rights,
and the unambiguous absence of the rule of law. This country did, how-
ever, have institutions that provided bank directors with incentives to
monitor one another, and allowed depositors and minority shareholders
to monitor bank directors. The country is Mexico during the thirty-ﬁve-
year dictatorship of Porﬁrio Díaz (1876–1911). If the property rightsview
of related lending is correct, then one would expect that Mexican bank-
ers should have looted their own banks or used them as mechanisms to
transfer resources to ﬁrms under their control. At the very least, they
should have allocated credit ineﬃciently, overinvesting in ﬁrms that they
controlled. If the corporate governance view is correct, then one would
expect that there would have been neither looting nor capital misalloca-
tion.
We ﬁnd that bankers neither looted their own banks nor did they misal-
locate capital. Rather, we ﬁnd that Mexican bankers primarily lent to their
own ﬁrms because information was costly and contract rights were ex-
tremely diﬃcult to enforce through the legal system.6 Related lending pro-
vided an informal means to assess ex ante risk and enforce contracts ex
post. We also ﬁnd that even when the economy was hit with a large exter-
nal shock, Mexico’s bankers did not use related loans as a mechanism to
loot their own banks. In addition, the loans they made to their own enter-
prises were no worse an allocation of credit than that which they could have
obtained by making arm’s-length loans to comparable enterprises. These
results are consistent with the literature on the ﬁnancial history of the de-
veloped nations, the literature about business groups in India, and recent
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6. For a discussion of the importance of the legal system for ﬁnancial development and eco-
nomic growth see Levine 1998, 1999 and La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
1998. For a discussion of the advantages that accrue to creditors from long-term relationships
in the credit market see Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia 1989; Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992;
Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995.work on the Asian crisis of 1997–98 (Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton
2003). The implication is that there is no necessary connection between re-
lated lending and looting, even in countries with weak property rights.
Related lending did not produce looting in Porﬁrian Mexico because
various institutions aligned the interests of bank directors, shareholders,
and depositors. The ﬁrst were the institutions that allowed bank directors
to monitor each other and enabled shareholders to police the directors.
The second were the institutions that governed the banking sector. These
institutions mandated high capital requirements, placed strong restrictions
on note issue, and created limited liability. The third was the design of the
banking rescue of 1908, the year in which Mexico was hit by a severe eco-
nomic downturn originating from the Panic of 1907 in the United States.
The Mexican government intervened as a lender of last resort, buying illiq-
uid loans from the banks, but it carefully structured the terms of its in-
tervention to ensure that the banks could not pass oﬀ their bad loans to
taxpayers. The end result was a remarkably stable and eﬃcient banking
system, despite the ubiquitous use of related lending.
We do ﬁnd that related lending gave rise to a more concentrated indus-
trial structure in downstream industries. That outcome, however, was a re-
sult of Mexico’s concentrated banking system. That is, bankers allocated
credit to entrepreneurs on the basis of relational ties, but few entrepreneurs
enjoyed such ties, because there were few banks. Nevertheless, it is not clear
that the degree of concentration in Mexico was suﬃciently high to create a
signiﬁcant degree of market power.
Our ﬁndings have implications beyond related lending. In recent years,
a large literature has emerged on the eﬀects of institutions on economic
growth.7 One of the ﬁndings of the literature is that there are numerous
cases of dictatorial governments that are unable or unwilling to eﬀectively
specify or enforce property rights, but that nevertheless experience pro-
longed periods of rapid growth (Przeworski et al. 2000, 177). Our ﬁndings
imply that economic actors may be able to compensate for weak legal in-
stitutions (at least for a time) by exploiting ties based on longstanding so-
cial and business relationships.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides a dis-
cussion of the data sets we develop. Section 6.3 provides a discussion of
how related lending came to be the dominant business strategy of Mexico’s
bankers. Section 6.4 analyzes our data on the performance of the banking
industry. Section 6.5 examines the impact of related lending on a down-
stream industry—cotton textiles. Section 6.6 concludes.
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7. See North and Weingast 1989; Barro 1991, 1997; Engerman and Sokoloﬀ 1997; Rajan
and Zingales 1998; Przeworski et al. 2000; Bates 2001; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
2001, 2002; Keefer (forthcoming).6.2 Sources and Methods
The analysis that we carry out on the causes and consequences of related
lending in Mexico draw on three bodies of evidence that we have devel-
oped. The ﬁrst body of evidence consists of bank ﬁnancial reports. These
reports were published in the Mexican ﬁnancial press and allow us to esti-
mate bank rates of return, share prices, dividend payments, and capital-
asset ratios.
The second body of evidence focuses on bank lending strategies. For two
of Mexico’s largest banks, the Banco Nacional de México and the Banco
Mercantil de Veracruz, we retrieved internal bank records that allowed us
to estimate the extent of related lending over long time periods—1884–
1911 and 1898–1906, respectively. These records were located in the Ar-
chivo Histórico Banamex and the Archivo de la Nación, both in Mexico
City. For four other large banks, we were able to develop a data set for a
cross-section of the loans they made in 1908. These records were also re-
trieved from the Archivo General de la Nación.8 The two banks for which
we have collected time series information (Banamex and the Banco Mer-
cantil de Veracruz) accounted on average for nearly half of total bank as-
sets. When we add the four banks for which we have cross-sectional data,
our sample of banks covers two-thirds of all bank assets.
The third body of evidence focuses on a downstream industry that re-
ceived related loans from the banks—cotton textiles. We note that the
Mexican cotton textile industry is an ideal natural laboratory with which
to study the impact of related lending on the real economy. In the ﬁrst
place, cotton textiles were Mexico’s largest manufacturing industry. In the
second place, the industry was ﬁnance-dependent, but at the same time it
approximated the requirements of perfect competition to an unusual de-
gree. Mexican law posed no direct barriers to entry into the industry. Nor
were their indirect barriers to entry posed by patent protection, propri-
etary technology, control of raw materials, advertising, branding, or con-
trol of wholesale or retail distribution. The capital equipment was easily di-
visible and scale economies were exhausted at small-ﬁrm sizes, compared
to such industries as steel, cement, paper, and chemicals. The industry was
also characterized by a high degree of entry and exit. Finally, high tariﬀs
protected the industry from foreign competition.
We study the eﬀect of related lending on this industry by employing the
Razo-Haber textile data set. We draw seven censuses from their data set:
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8. We retrieved records of these loans by examining interbank loan sales to the state-owned
Caja de Préstamos para Obras de Irrigación. See the Sesiones Administrativas de la Caja de
Préstamos, Box 1, located in Galería 2 of the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City.
Data for the total size of the loan portfolios of these banks were retrieved from their end-of-
year balance sheets published in the Economista Mexicano.1888, 1891, 1893, 1895, 1896, 1912,and 1913.9 These censuses are enumer-
ated at the mill level and contain information on inputs and outputs as well
as information about location and ownership. We also draw state and na-
tional data on textile inputs and outputs from their data set for every year
from 1891 to 1913. This state and national data allow us to make certain
that the years for which we have mill-level censuses are not outliers. Table
6.1 presents data on the overall size and growth of this industry.
We then coded the data set in order to capture relationships between
bankers and textile mill owners. Speciﬁcally, we code for bank board mem-
bers who were also the sole proprietors of a textile mill, a partner in a ﬁrm
that owned a textile mill, or who served on the board of directors of a joint
stock corporation that owned a textile mill. We denote such mills as being
“bank-related.”10
Table 6.2presents aggregate data on the relationships between mill own-
ers and bankers. In 1888, 21 percent of textile mills were owned by bank di-
rectors or their close relatives. Eighty-eight percent of the bank-related
mills were fully owned by directors, the remainder being organized as joint
stock companies. By 1913, the proportion of bank-related mills had grown
to 54 percent, and the proportion of such mills organized as joint-stock
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9. This data set links mills and ﬁrms across manufacturing censuses and excise tax records
over the period 1850–1932. For a discussion of the sources and methods used to build the
panel, see Razo and Haber 1998. The census records employed in this study can be found in
García Cubas (1893); Mexico, Dirección General de Estadística 1894; Mexico, Secretaría de
Fomento (1890); Mexico, Secretaría de Hacienda (1896a); Mexico, Secretaría de Hacienda
(1896b); Archivo General de la Nación, Ramo de Trabajo, box 5, ﬁle 4; Archivo General de
la Nación, Ramo de Trabajo, box 31, ﬁle 2. We have recoded their data set to more eﬀectively
follow ﬁrms during the 1888–1913 period. We have also recalculated the real value of output
by substituting the Gómez-Galvarriato and Musacchio price index for the INEGI cotton tex-
tile price index employed by Razo and Haber (1998). In addition, we have culled stamping and
knitting mills from the data set and checked the data set against original manuscripts to ver-
ify observations with inordinately high or low values.
10. We note that our deﬁnition of bank connection is restrictive. Entrepreneurs who were
connected to a bank in some way other than overlap between their membership on a bank
board and ownership of a textile ﬁrm (for example, overlapping board memberships in a
third, unobserved ﬁrm in a diﬀerent industry, or marriage to a relative of a member of a bank
board) are coded as “non-related” ﬁrms. We note that the assumption that overlap between
mill ownership and a bank dictatorship is a good proxy for bank credit is consistent with three
fundamental facts about Mexican banking. First, we know from case studies by historians
that some banks were founded by textile entrepreneurs for the purpose of ﬁnancing their ex-
isting manufacturing ventures (Gamboa Ojeda 1985; Gamboa Ojeda and Estrada 1986; Ro-
dríguez López 1995). Second, in the case of Banamex (Mexico’s largest bank), some of its
board members were textile industrialists and the bank itself was a major stockholder in one
of the country’s largest textile companies. We know from the minutes of the bank’s board
meetings that it lent heavily to these enterprises (Maurer 2002, 98). Third, evidence from
other large banks (reviewed below) makes it clear that they lent primarily to their own board
members, members of their families, and their business associates. We also know that the di-
rectors of many of these banks also owned textile mills. The list of banks related to textile en-
trepreneurs or joint stock textile companies consists of Banamex, the Banco de Londres y
Mexico, the Banco Oriental, the Banco de Nuevo León, the Banco de Durango, the Banco de
Coahuila, the Banco Mercantil de Veracruz, the Banco de Guanajuato, the Banco de Estado
de México, and the Banco de Zacatecas.Table 6.1 The Mexican textile industry
Number  Output in  Output in  Price 
of mills 1900 pesos meters Spindles Workers index
1878 73 n.a. 73,597,000 249,294 11,922
1888 84 11,484,000 n.a. 249,591 15,083 94
1891 85 13,795,758 93,526,834 277,784 14,051 87
1893 113 19,925,011 122,550,335 370,570 21,963 96
1895 98 26,013,666 170,928,751 411,090 18,208 91
1896 100 25,338,269 206,411,839 430,868 19,771 93
1898 112 n.a. n.a. 469,547 n.a. 93
1899 120 32,564,462 231,685,692 491,443 23,731 91
1900 122 35,458,578 261,397,092 588,474 27,767 100
1901 133 35,553,376 262,043,539 591,506 26,709 95
1902 124 27,938,569 235,955,965 595,728 24,964 103
1903 115 31,338,693 262,169,838 632,601 26,149 118
1904 115 34,645,972 280,709,989 635,940 27,456 123
1905 130 46,097,321 310,692,041 678,058 30,162 111
1906 130 44,894,422 349,711,687 688,217 31,673 114
1907 129 41,325,963 376,516,577 693,842 33,132 125
1908 132 35,303,315 368,370,354 732,876 35,816 121
1909 129 36,656,495 314,227,874 726,278 32,229 118
1910 121 39,118,584 315,322,022 702,874 31,963 129
1911 119 39,286,480 341,441,477 725,297 32,147 131
1912 126 46,848,154 319,668,409 762,149 32,209 136
1913 128 36,642,671 298,897,198 752,804 32,641 147
Sources:Haber 1989, table 8.1; Haber, Razo, Maurer 2003, tables 5.2 and 5.8. Original censuses for 1888,
1891, 1893, 1895, 1896, 1912, and 1913 can be found in: México, Secretaría de Fomento, 1890; México,
Departmento de Fomento, 1893; México, Dirección General de de Estadística, 1894; México, Secretaría
de Hacienda, 1896a; México, Secretaría de Hacienda, 1896b; México, Archivo General de la Nación,
Ramo de Trabajo, Box 5, ﬁle 4; and Box 31, ﬁle 2.
Note: n.a.   not available.
Table 6.2 Mexico’s textile industry, by bank relation, 1888–1913
Percent of output  Percent of output  Percent of capacity 
Number of  Percent of  (by value)  (by volume)  (by spindlage) 
mills related  mills related  produced by bank  produced by bank  installed in bank 
to banks to banks related mills related mills related mills
1888 18 21 32 33
1891 17 20 32
1893 33 30 48 51 51
1895 38 39 58 59 59
1896 40 40 58 60 62
1900 70 57 75
1904 64 55 75
1912 69 55 79 80 82
1913 69 54 77 78 80
Source: See table 6.1.companies had risen to 27 percent. The percentage of installed capacity
controlled by related mills increased from 33 percent in 1888 to 80 percent
in 1913.11
6.3 Related Lending and the Mexican Banking System
In 1878, the Mexican banking system was so small as to be practically
nonexistent. Only two chartered banks existed in the entire country. One
was a branch of a British bank that operated in Mexico City and focused
primarily on ﬁnancing foreign trade. The other was a small American-
founded operation chartered by the government of the border state of Chi-
huahua.12
Within a few years, however, Porﬁrio Díaz (Mexico’s ruler from 1876
to 1911) enacted legislation that engendered the rapid expansion of the
banking system from this extremely low base—by providing bankers with
a series of segmented monopolies and duopolies. Only the two national
banks—the Banco Nacional de México (henceforth Banamex) and the
Banco de Londres y México (henceforth BLM)—were permitted to branch
freely across state lines. Other banks were prohibited from branching out-
side their concession territories, which were generally contiguous with state
lines. Federal law also erected extremely high barriers to entry. First, banks
without a federal charter were prohibited from issuing notes, meaning that
they could not eﬀectively compete against chartered banks.13 Second, the
government levied a 2 percent tax on bank capital and a 5 percent tax on
banknotes—but exempted the ﬁrst bank in each state to receive a federal
charter. Third, it established a minimum capital requirement of 250,000 dol-
lars—ﬁve times the minimum capital needed to found a national bank in
the United States. Finally, in case these barriers proved insuﬃcient, the law
gave the Finance Minister the right to approve all issues of new bank stock,
which was one of the primary ways Mexican banks raised new resources
during this period. The fact that the brother of the ﬁnance minister between
1893 and 1911 sat on the board of directors of the country’s largest bank
provided him with an obvious incentive to exercise his veto.14
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11. Following Kane 1988, we measure installed capacity by spindles, which constitute the
most important capital input for the production of cotton textile goods.
12. Until the growth of the chartered banking system in the decades after 1884, most ﬁ-
nancial intermediation took place in merchant houses, which issued bills of exchange and ad-
vanced credits to entrepreneurs in their social networks. These institutions did not, however,
have any of the advantages of banks: they did not sell equity to outside investors, they did not
have limited liability, they did not take deposits, and their bills of exchange had to be 100 per-
cent backed by specie reserves. In short, they were diﬀerent from modern banks in a funda-
mental sense: they made money by speculating with the funds of their proprietor, rather than
with funds that belonged to people other than the proprietor. For an examination of how such
a merchant house operated see Walker 1987.
13. See Maurer 2002, ch. 2; Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003, ch. 4.
14. See Maurer 2002 and Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003.The short-term consequence of these high barriers to entry was a rapid
expansion of the banking system. By 1897, when the law took its ﬁnal form,
the number of banks had risen to 10, with total assets of 50 million dollars.
By 1911, there were 42 banks, controlling assets of 385 million dollars (see
table 6.3). The ratio of commercial bank assets to GDP was 27 percent,
roughly the same as its ratio in 2004 (33 percent).
The long-term consequence of high barriers to entry, however, was that
Mexico remained relatively under-banked. In 1910, even if we include
mortgage banks and private unchartered banks dedicated primarily to ﬁ-
nancing foreign trade, there were only 42 banks in the entire country with
assets totaling US$414 million. Mexico possessed 364,286 inhabitants per
bank, compared to 3,852 in the United States. The ratio of bank assets to
GDP was only 27 percent, versus 65 percent in the United States.
The level of concentration in this banking system was extremely high.
Banamex’s share of total assets never fell below 36 percent. The Herﬁnd-
ahl concentration stabilized around 0.20, meaning that a system with 42
banks (35 of which provided data) was roughly as concentrated as one with
ﬁve equally sized banks. In fact, measures of the total Mexican banking
market greatly overstate the degree of competition. The lack of interstate
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Table 6.3 The Mexican banking industry, 1896–1912
Number of  Total bank assets  Banamex  BLM market  Herﬁndahl 
reporting banksa (in U.S.$ millions) market share (%) share (%) indexb
1896 6 50 58 28 0.42
1897 10 54 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1899 13 78 51 26 0.34
1900 17 113 39 25 0.22
1901 20 107 38 22 0.20
1902 23 107 35 19 0.17
1903 25 130 37 17 0.18
1904 26 184 41 15 0.20
1905 26 205 39 18 0.20
1906 28 264 40 16 0.21
1907 28 301 44 14 0.23
1908 34 339 40 12 0.19
1909 35 283 37 12 0.17
1910 35 302 39 12 0.18
1911 35 385 39 12 0.18
1912 34 342 36 11 0.16
Source: Calculated from balance sheets published in El Economista Mexicano.
Note: Banamex indicates the Banco Nacional de México. BLM indicates the Banco de Londres y 
México.
aIn 1911 there were 42 banks in operation, but only 35 reported data to the Secretary of the Treasury.
The banks that did not report were small operations.
bComputed nationally, this assumes that banks with territorial concessions could operate in one an-
other’s concession territories. Thus, this is a lower bound estimate.competition (outside a few northern border states and the Distrito Fed-
eral) and limits on the number of banks in any given region meant that Ba-
namex and the BLM were able to use their privileged position to operate
like ineﬃcient monopolists: they held excess liquidity to ration credit and
drive up their rate of return (Maurer 2002, 70–92).
One might think that powerful politicians might have objected to this
cozy arrangement, until you consider that they received a steady stream of
rents from the banks. For example, Banamex’s board of directors was pop-
ulated by members of Díaz’s coterie, including Pablo Macedo (the Presi-
dent of Congress and long-serving congressman from the Distrito Fed-
eral), Roberto Núñez (the under-secretary of the treasury), Sebastián
Camacho (senator for the Distrito Federal), Pablo Escandón (congress-
man from Guanajuato, governor of Morelos, and Porﬁrio Díaz’s chief of
staﬀ), and Julio Limantour (the brother of the ﬁnance minister). The chair-
man of the board of Banamex’s largest competitor, the Banco de Londres
y México, was none other than the secretary of war (and former mayor of
Mexico City, former secretary of the interior, and former secretary of de-
velopment), Manuel González Cosío. Joining him on the board was Rafael
Dondé (senator from the state of Sonora). In addition, Julio Limantour
was a major stockholder in the bank. The Banco Internacional Hipote-
cario, a mortgage bank, was similarly populated with political notables, in-
cluding Julio Limantour, Porﬁrio Díaz Jr. (the dictator’s son), and Emilio
Pardo (federal deputy from the states of Hidalgo, México, and the Dis-
trito Federal, senator from Tlaxcala, and ambassador to Belgium and the
Netherlands). The board of the Banco Mexicano de Comercio e Industria
also contained insiders. Its chairman was Pablo Macedo (see above). Join-
ing Macedo on the board was Guillermo de Landa y Escandón (a senator
from the state of Chihuahua and governor of the Federal District; Haber,
Razo, and Maurer 2003).
These arrangements were paralleled at the state level. The only diﬀer-
ence was that state governors, rather than cabinet ministers, sat on the
banks’ boards and received a steady stream of directors’ fees, stock distri-
butions, and dividends. In some cases, the governor himself received the
bank concession. In point of fact, the banking system was deliberately con-
ceived to distribute beneﬁts to the state governors, and give them a stake in
the maintenance of Porﬁrio Díaz’s rule.15
The banks of the southern states of Chiapas and Oaxaca clearly illus-
trate the pattern. Emilio Rabasa served as governor of Chiapas in 1891–
1894. Rafael Pimentel succeeded him in 1895–99. The Rabasa family
owned a large stake in the Banco de Chiapas, and a member of the Pimentel
family sat on the bank’s board of directors. Another member of the Pi-
mentel family, Emilio Pimentel, governed Oaxaca from 1902 to 1911, and
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15. See Maurer 2002, 33–47, 93–114; Razo 2003; Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003.it should come as no surprise that the Pimentel family was represented on
the board of the Banco de Oaxaca as well. The president of the Banco de
Oaxaca, Luis Mier y Terán, had himself served as governor of the state be-
tween 1884 and 1887.
Northern state governors played as prominent a role in the banking sys-
tem as their southern counterparts. In Durango, the founders of the Banco
de Durango placed Governor Juan Manuel Flores on their board of direc-
tors (Rodríguez López 1995, 22). In San Luis Potosí, two members of the
Díez Gutiérrez family governed the state between 1881 and 1898—both sat
on the board of the Banco de San Luis Potosí. In the state of Sinaloa, Gov-
ernor Mariano Martínez de Castro (governor from 1881 to 1884 and again
in 1888–92) sat on the board of directors of the Banco Occidental. In the
state of Zacatecas, Governor Génaro García Valdez (1900–04) served as
president of the Banco de Zacatecas and sat on the board of the Banco Oc-
cidental in Sinaloa. In Chihuahua, Luis Terrazas and his relatives sat on
the boards of all the state’s major banks. In fact, Enrique Creel, Terrazas’
son-in-law, received the concession for the Banco Minero de Chihuahua.
Creel himself would later serve as governor of the state. In the central state
of Mexico, the founders of the Banco del Estado de México reserved a
board position for the former governor, José Zubieta, who governed from
1881 to 1889.16
In other cases, the connection to the state governor was less direct than
a seat on the board, but strong nonetheless. In Puebla, for example, Gov-
ernor Mucio Martínez received neither stock in the Banco Oriental nor a
seat on the board. The Banco Oriental did, however, lend over 264,000 pe-
sos to Martínez. This debt, along with an additional 400,000 pesos held by
individual creditors, was never repaid. Instead, the major ﬁnanciers of
Puebla, among whom were the principal shareholders of the Banco Orien-
tal, bailed Martínez out by forming a partnership with him and eﬀectively
assuming his liabilities (Gutiérrez Alvarez 2000, 125–26).
Financial markets could not substitute for banks in an environment
characterized by high information costs. Mexico created a general incor-
poration law in 1889, but very few ﬁrms used the law to sell stock directly
to the public. The reason was that stockholders had few ways to monitor
the directors of public companies. Financial reporting requirements were
not enforced. In fact, ﬁrms often went for years without publishing their ﬁ-
nancial statements, despite a law mandating that they do so. Moreover, in-
vestors had no way of determining whether the founders of a ﬁrm (who
typically served as its directors) had divested themselves of their holdings
in the ﬁrm. The result was that the public tended to invest only in enter-
prises controlled by individuals with established reputations for political
Related Lending: Manifest Looting or Good Governance? 223
16. Board members from the Boletín Financiero y Minero, 2/28/1907, 6/18/1907, 6/10/1908,
and 4/14/1908. Political careers from Camp (1991), appendix F.connections and ﬁnancial solvency: that is, enterprises that were already
connected to banks (Maurer 2002).
In an environment characterized by extremely high information costs,
bank directors had strong incentives to protect their reputations and moni-
tor one another. There was neither deposit insurance nor guarantees that
banks would redeem their notes for specie on demand. As Huybens, Luce,
and Pratap have shown, depositors policed bank behavior by withdrawing
funds from banks that pursued risky strategies (Huybens, Luce, and Pratap
2005). In addition, Mexico’s banks typically had capital-adequacy ratios of
30–35 percent. In part, these capital ratios were driven by the legal require-
ment that note issues not exceed two (sometimes three) times a bank’s cash
on hand, or three times its paid-in capital (Maurer 2002, 43, 111). In equal
part, however, these capital ratios were driven by risk aversion on the parts
of both bankers and their creditors (depositors and noteholders). Banks
usually did not, in fact, issue notes up to their legal maximum.
Bank directors owned substantial stakes in their banks. As of the 1884
Commercial Code, receiving a bank charter required the founding group
(who became the directors) to subscribe to the ﬁrst tranche of the bank’s
capital. Banks could later sell additional tranches of capital to outsiders. In
addition, bank directors could (and often did) sell parts of their original
stakes. These outside shareholders (who owned a majority of bank stock)
then insisted on the appointment of independent directors (typically other
bankers) who monitored the founding board members. This meant that di-
rectors had strong incentives to monitor each other (because their own cap-
ital and reputations were at risk) and that shareholders possessed a mecha-
nism to monitor directors.17 In fact, we have direct historical evidence that
this mechanism was employed by outside shareholders. In March 1908, the
outside shareholders of the Banco de Jalisco, displeased with the discovery
of severe irregularities in the bank’s books, replaced the entire board of di-
rectors save Vice President Eugenio Cuzin (Maurer 2002, 113).
Mexico’s bankers started out by making arm’s-length loans, but quickly
shifted to related lending. Banamex, the largest bank in the country, re-
ceived one of the ﬁrst federal charters (in 1884). It began by making arm’s-
length loans. The problem was that it lacked good mechanisms to assess the
quality of borrowers or the collateral they oﬀered. It therefore responded
by placing onerous requirements on borrowers, but these only worked to
create adverse selection. The history of one of its largest manufacturing
loans is perhaps instructive in this regard. In 1884, it opened a 200,000 peso
credit line (roughly $200,000) to the Hercules textile factory for the pur-
pose of purchasing a new plant and equipment. Banamex charged an in-
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17. See Ludlow 1985, 299–346; Gamboa Ojeda 2003, 106, 111, 116, 129, 132; Ludlow 2003,
147–49, 152; Cerutti 2003, 196, 211–13; Romero y Barra 2003, 229; Rodriguez Lopez 2003,
271–2; Maurer 2002, 74–80, 94–95, 111–13.terest rate of 8 percent and required that the loan be collateralized with
250,000 pesos worth of the factory’s inventory, with the warehousing costs
to be borne by the factory. Given that the factory had to ﬁnance the cost of
the inventory, this implied an eﬀective interest rate of 18 percent. Terms
like these, of course, tend to attract low-quality borrowers—and this case
was not an exception to that general rule. The Hercules mill was unable to
make its payments. Eventually, Banamex sold a portion of the loan to a
New York trading house (for only 65 percent of its face value) and re-
couped the rest by converting the loan into an equity interest in the mill.
This loan, as well as a series of others in which the collateral turned out
to be ﬁctitious or unrecoverable, caused Banamex’s directors to shift strat-
egy: after 1886 it lent primarily to its own directors, members of their fam-
ilies, or their close business associates. In fact, from 1886 to 1901 all of the
private (nongovernment) loans made by Banamex went to its own direc-
tors. After 1901 Banamex extended credit to nonrelated borrowers, but
only if they satisﬁed one of two criteria: the borrower had a loan guarantee
from the federal government (as was the case with some railroad compa-
nies); or the borrower was either the Banco Oriental or one of that bank’s
directors. The reason given by Banamex board members for the latter ex-
emption is instructive: most of the loans made by the Banco Oriental went
to its own directors, all well-known textile magnates. Loans to them, and
to their bank, were a means of investing in their manufacturing enterprises.
Thus Banco Oriental loans were deemed low risk precisely because the
bank practiced related lending.18
Related lending, in fact, appears to have been standard business prac-
tice. Data we have retrieved on the loan portfolio of the Banco Mercantil
de Veracruz indicates that 86 percent of its loans to individuals from 1898
to 1906 went to the bank’s own directors.19 Banamex’s largest competitor,
BLM (which controlled, on average, 17 percent of total bank assets), also
made sizable loans to its own board members to ﬁnance manufacturing
start-ups (Maurer 2002, 103). A cross-section of loans we have drawn for
1908 for four other banks indicate similar lending strategies. Twenty-nine
percent of the Banco de Nuevo León’s loans went to a single ﬁrm, owned
by one of its directors. Thirty-one percent of the Banco Mercantil de Mon-
terrey’s loans also went to a single ﬁrm owned by one of its directors. Fifty-
one percent of the Banco de Durango’s loans went to enterprises owned by
the family members of one of its directors. An astounding 72 percent of the
Banco de Coahuila’s loans went to a single ﬁrm owned by family members
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18. See Maurer 2002, 95–103, 108–10; Maurer and Sharma 2001, 953–56. The case of the
Banco Oriental and its relationship to the Puebla textile industry is detailed in Gamboa Ojeda
(1985) and Gamboa Ojeda and Estrada (1986).
19. The data for this estimate come from a random sample of 50 entries in the Libro de Re-
sponsibilidades of the Banco Mercantil de Veracruz, located in Galería 2 of the Archivo Gen-
eral de la Nación in Mexico City.of a director.20 Qualitative evidence from case studies by historians on the
Banco de la Laguna, the Banco Occidental, and the Banco de Durango
concur with our quantitative analysis.21
Mexico’s bankers did not choose to lend to a particular company and then
demand a seat on that company’s board of directors. Rather, a group of tex-
tile mill owners, for example, would obtain a bank charter in conjunction
with a powerful politician, sell shares in the bank to outside investors, issue
bank notes, and then lend those notes to textile mills that he already owned
(or, in some cases, found an entirely new mill). Of the 34 textile mills that
switched from being nonrelated to being bank-related between 1888 and
1912, only one was a ﬁrm that was purchased by an existing banker. Thirty-
three were owned by textile entrepreneurs who later became bankers. In
short, bankers did not look at their banks as independent credit intermedi-
aries in the textbook sense of the term. Instead, they looked at them as the
investment arms of their widespread commercial and industrial interests.
6.4 Related Lending and the Performance of the Banking System
Did Mexican bankers use related loans to loot their own banks? One
would imagine that they had strong incentives to do so. Mexico was hit by
an external shock in 1908 that drove down the prices of its major export
commodities by between 14 and 56 percent, depending on the product. Ex-
port prices declined 19 percent in the 1908–1909 ﬁscal year. They declined
an additional 2 percent in 1909–10 (Cárdenas 2003, 240). The decline in
prices caused mineral and agricultural producers to curtail production by
between 20 and 64 percent (depending on the product), which in turn
caused the demand for manufactured goods to fall by 9 to 20 percent (also
depending on the product). The export crisis coincided with a severe
drought in northwestern Mexico and the Gulf states, which caused the
price of corn (Mexico’s primary staple crop) to rise 128 percent between
June 1908 and June 1909, and engendered a spike in agricultural imports
(Cárdenas 2003, 242–43). The decline in Mexico’s export, agricultural, and
manufacturing sectors soon threatened the banking system. Deposits fell,
interest rates on commercial paper rose from 8 percent to 10 percent, and
net new lending dropped to zero. Indeed, total bank assets declined 17 per-
cent from 1908 to 1909.22
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20. We retrieved records of these loans by examining interbank loan sales to the state-
owned Caja de Préstamos para Obras de Irrigación. See the Sesiones Administrativas de la
Caja de Préstamos, Box 1, located in Galería 2 of the Archivo General de la Nación in Mex-
ico City. Data for the total size of the loan portfolios of these banks were retrieved from their
end-of-year balance sheets, published in the Economista Mexicano.
21. See Aguilar Aguilar 2003, 74; Rodriguez López 2003, 272, 278–79; Cerutti 2003, 169-
70, 196, 204.
22. Bank balances and the interest rate on commercial paper from Economista Mexicano.
Bond price data from Escalona Salazar (1998).In response to the crisis, the government quickly organized a rescue. In
September 1908 the federal government chartered the Caja de Préstamos
para Obras de Irrigación y Fomento de la Agricultura. The Caja was ﬁ-
nanced by requiring Mexico’s four largest banks to purchase 10 million pe-
sos of its shares, 25 percent of which they were not permitted to sell. The
Caja then issued 44.5 million pesos of government-guaranteed bonds in
Europe, with an eﬀective coupon rate of 5.1 percent. (The nominal yield on
Mexican government bonds in 1908 was 4.3 percent.) The Caja used the
funds from the bond and equity sales to purchase bank loans and bank-
issued mortgage bonds in order to inject liquidity into the banking system
(Maurer 2002, 66–68). The ﬁnancial press greeted the plan with cries of re-
lief. “Inasmuch as it is empowered to take over from the other chartered
Banks the long-time loans to agricultural and industrial concerns which
they are now carrying,” wrote the Mexican Herald(Sept. 3, 1908), “its foun-
dation will greatly ease the local business situation, and enable the other
Banks to give more eﬃcacious ﬁnancial assistance to the commercial com-
munity and to the general public.”23
By mid-1909, the Caja’s outstanding purchases of bank loans totaled
23.8 million pesos. In addition, it had purchased an additional 8.9 million
pesos of securities (mostly bonds issued by the clearinghouse used by the
regional banks), and it had deposited 20.7 million pesos directly into the
banking system (Maurer 2002, 67). The Caja de Préstamos was particu-
larly vital in rescuing Mexico’s second-largest bank, the Banco de Lon-
dres y México. In inﬂation-adjusted terms, the Banco de Londres y Méx-
ico’s loans and discounts fell an astonishing 40 percent between the
beginning of 1908 and the end of 1909 (Maurer 2002, 68). By June 1910,
funds advanced from the Caja to BLM made up 21 percent of the Caja’s
asset portfolio.24
The Caja de Préstamo’s statutes were carefully written to reduce the in-
centive for the banks to pass bad debts to the taxpayers. First, the Caja’s
charter required the banks to “unconditionally” guarantee the loans they
sold to the Caja (Economista Mexicana1908). Second, as a matter of policy,
the Caja often agreed to rebate to the banks 1 percentage point of the inter-
est it collected on the loans that the banks transferred to Caja.25 Third, the
banks were required to purchase 25 percent of the equity in the Caja, which
they were not allowed to resell (Economista Mexicana 1908). Through
these measures, the designers of the 1908 bank bailout hoped to be able
to act as a lender of last resort and provide the banks with desperately-
needed liquidity without creating moral hazard and a liability for the fed-
eral government.
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23. See the Mexican Herald (9/3/1908).
24. Calculated from data in the Sesiones Administrativas de la Caja de Préstamos, Archivo
General de la Nacion, Mexico City.
25. Sesiones Administrativas de la Caja de Préstamos, Box 1, various entries.6.4.1 Did Directors Loot?
The most obvious sign of bankers extracting resources from their own
banks would be an unstable banking system. The evidence indicates, how-
ever, that Mexico’s banking system was remarkably stable. As shown in
table 6.3, the number of reporting banks and total bank assets increased
steadily. The only downturn in real bank assets occurred in 1909, as a re-
sult of the crisis of 1908, but the system’s growth resumed in 1910.
One might argue that although the system was stable, directors were still
able to extract resources from outside shareholders. That hypothesis, how-
ever, is not consistent with the fact that Mexican banks were extremely
proﬁtable. The real return on the book value of equity in 1901–12 was 12
percent. These returns were not driven by the proﬁts earned by a few large
banks: the unweighted average real return-on-equity for all banks was 10
percent per year.
Mexican banks returned high proﬁts to shareholders by paying out reg-
ular dividends. In fact, over the 1901–10 decade, the banks paid out almost
all of their proﬁts in the form of dividends.26 Steady dividends translated
into high returns from banking stock. As table 6.4 shows, someone who
purchased an index of banking stock weighted by market capitalization
would have earned a real return of 9 percent per year. Our estimate of mar-
ket returns is not driven by the high returns available from owning the
stock of the largest banks: an investment strategy based on purchasing
equally sized stakes in all the banks would have yielded a slightly higher
real annual return of 10 percent. The returns available to investors in Mex-
ican banking stock were, in fact, more than twice those available from in-
vesting in the Dow Jones Industrials (see table 6.4).
One might argue that the high returns investors earned in the banking
sector were simply compensation for risk. If this were the case, then we
would expect the value of banking stock to be highly discounted. We there-
fore estimated two measures of the discount on banking stock: market-to-
book ratios and dividend yields. Table 6.5shows the average (weighted and
unweighted) market-to-book value ratio for Mexican banks in 1900–11.
Bank stock traded at an average premium of 33 percent over its book
value.27
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26. In fact, banks paid dividends worth 106 percent of their proﬁts over the 1901–10 period.
We estimated this ﬁgure from balance sheets published in the Economista Mexicano. Proﬁts
were calculated as changes in real net worth (adjusted for issues of new stock) plus dividends
in 1900 pesos. Real net worth was calculated by revaluing assets and liabilities in 1900 pesos
and subtracting the value of new stock issues, if any.
27. Only the Banco de Michoacán in the years 1909 and 1910 was valued at less than its
book value. The Banco de Michoacán was hard hit by the ﬁnancial panic in 1909. Banamex
agreed to accept responsibility for redeeming the Banco de Michoacán’s banknotes if the
Banco de Michoacán would agree to abandon its right to issue further notes. There were no
losses to depositors or noteholders (Maurer 2002, 80).Table 6.4 Real rates of return on Mexican banking, 1901–1912 (%)
Real returns on  Real returns from owning 
book equity an index of bank stocks
Real returns from 
Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted the  Dow  Jones  index 
averageb average averageb average (peso terms)
1901 10 10 11 17 –7
1902 14 13 16 17 –7
1903 1 0 8 14 –24
1904 4767 4 1
1905 40 29 33 29 37
1906 23 13 16 20 –5
1907 4668 – 4 1
1908 0423 5 2
1909 14 9 12 –1 7
1910 4 3 9 10 –21
1911 20 14 –8 –4 9
1912a 11 10 –2 1 1
Average 12 10 9 10 4
Source: Stock prices and dividends reported in the Economista Mexicano. Dow Jones data from Haber,
Razo, Maurer, table 5.12.
Note: All values converted to 1900 pesos using the Gómez-Musacchio (1998) index.
aFirst semester, annualized.
bWeighted by market capitalization.
Table 6.5 Market-to-book ratios for Mexican banks













Source: Stock prices and dividends reported in the Economista Mexicano.
aWeighted by market capitalization.The data on banking yields is also inconsistent with the hypothesis that
investors heavily discounted banking stock. As table 6.6 demonstrates, be-
tween 1901 and 1912 the diﬀerence between the yield on Mexican banking
stock and Mexican government bonds dropped from 4.4 percentage points
to 3.0 percentage points. In other words, the risks associated with owning
banking stock appear to have declined over time.
Did the banks succeed in weathering the crisis through the expedient of
passing oﬀ their bad related loans to the Caja de Préstamos—much the
way that Mexican banks passed oﬀ their bad loans to the fund for the pro-
tection of bank savings (FOBAPROA) after the 1995–98 bailout? If that
were the case, then we would expect the Caja de Préstamos to have lost
money. The evidence, however, indicates that the opposite occurred—the
Caja de Préstamos earned positive returns. In point of fact, the Caja de
Préstamos may be the only government-organized banking rescue in
world history to have made money. We calculate that the Caja generated
a real return to all claimants on its assets (bondholders and shareholders)
of 4.9 percent in 1909, 6.0 percent in 1910, and 5.7 percent in 1911.28
6.5 Did Related Lending Misallocate Capital?
One might argue that even if bankers did not loot enough to jeopardize
the health of the banking system, they may have nonetheless used their re-
lated enterprises to transfer resources from bank depositors and outside
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28. Calculated from the balance sheets of the Caja de Préstamos, published in Economista
Mexicano.
Table 6.6 Banking stock yields (%)
Average yield  Average yield on  Bank share 
on bank sharesa government bonds premium
1901 9.4 5.0 4.4
1902 8.4 4.9 3.5
1903 8.3 4.9 3.4
1904 7.5 4.8 2.7
1905 8.1 4.3 3.8
1906 8.0 4.3 3.7
1907 7.1 4.4 2.7
1908 7.5 4.3 3.2
1909 6.8 4.3 2.5
1910 7.4 4.3 3.1
1911 7.7 4.5 3.2
1912 7.6 4.6 3.0
Source: Stock prices and dividends reported in the Economista Mexicano. Government bond
yields from Escalona Salazar (1998, 93).
aDividends divided by market price of common stock.shareholders to themselves. In order to test this hypothesis we turn to our
panel of textile mills. If bankers were using their textile mills to channel re-
sources from the banks to themselves, then we would not expect bank-
related mills to grow. The mills would simply be mechanisms to extract the
wealth of the bank.
When we look at the growth in the size of mills, however, we ﬁnd precisely
the opposite: not only did bank-related mills grow, they grew faster than
their nonrelated competitors. In table 6.7 we calculate the growth rates of
mills that existed across various census periods. In each intercensus period,
we ﬁnd that mills that were bank-related outgrew mills that were not.
One might argue, however, that bank directors used their banks in order to
quickly build up their enterprises and then sell them for cash. The evidence,
however, indicates that bankers who invested in textile mills viewed them as
long-term investments. Of the 70 bank-related mills in 1900 (when the num-
ber of bank-related mills peaked) only seven had changed hands by 1913.29
6.5.1 Technical Eﬃciency
A somewhat weaker argument would suggest that bankers may have
used their banks to support their own relatively ineﬃcient ﬁrms. In this
view, bank-related mills may have been productive enterprises (rather than
zombie ﬁrms whose purpose was to extract bank resources), but would be
less productive than their competitors. If this hypothesis holds, it implies
that related lending misallocated capital.
We estimate a time series, cross-sectional regression on labor productiv-
ity. The results are in table 6.8.30 We control for mill age, location, bank re-
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29. An additional seven mills shut down over the period.
30. We measure output as the real value of production. Following Atack (1985) and
Sokoloﬀ (1984) on productivity in the United States, and Bernard and Jones (1996) on inter-
national productivity comparisons, we took the number of workers as the measure of the la-
bor input. We adjusted, however, for changes in the legal length of the workday. We also esti-
mated an OLS regression on labor productivity in which we controlled for mill size and capital
intensity. That regression produced similar results. We therefore do not report them.
Table 6.7 Average annual growth in capacity across census periods (%)
Years between censuses Bank-related mills Nonrelated mills
1888–1893 5 5.5 4.0
1893–1895 2 11.0 8.4
1895–1896 1 7.6 4.1
1896–1912 16 2.4 0.4
Source: See table 6.1.
Note:Annualized rate of growth in capacity, measured in spindles, among ﬁrms listed in both
censuses. Thus, the 1888–1993 cohort represents ﬁrms listed in both the 1888 and 1893 cen-
suses.lation, and whether it was publicly traded.31 The results do not support the
hypothesis that bank-related mills had lower labor productivity than their
nonrelated competitors: none of the coeﬃcients on bank-relation are sig-
niﬁcant.32
A skeptical reader might argue that our productivity measures treat each
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Table 6.8 Labor productivity regressions
Spec 1 Spec 2
No. of observations 486 486























Source: See table 6.1.
Notes: Functional form is OLS. Controls for mill age, location, and traded status did not 
materially aﬀect the results. Dependent variable   (ln) output per worker (in 1900 pesos). 
T-statistics in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 99 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 90 percent level.
31. We do not report the results on mill age, location, and traded status because none of the
coeﬃcients were large or signiﬁcant, and because the addition of these variables had no ma-
terial impact on our cross-sectional dummies or the interaction of the cross-sectional dum-
mies with the dummy for bank relation.
32. The year dummies indicate rapid productivity growth from 1893 to 1895, and then ﬂat
productivity growth after 1895.observation (one mill-year) equally. The regressions do not weight the re-
sults by ﬁrm sizes. Thus, it might be the case that small, particularly ef-
ﬁcient, related mills drive the regression results. We therefore break the
sample of mills into two sectors, nonrelated and bank-related, and calcu-
late the labor productivity of each sector in the aggregate for individual
census years. The results, reported in table 6.9, indicate that for the entire
period under study, there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in productivity be-
tween the bank-related mills, taken as a whole, and their nonrelated com-
petitors.
6.5.2 Economic Eﬃciency
An even more skeptical reader might argue that the lack of diﬀerence in
technical eﬃciency between bank-related and nonrelated mills is to be ex-
pected. The ineﬃcient mills went out of business and hence dropped out of
our data set. Such a reader would argue that the right criterion is economic
eﬃciency, and that bank-related mills were less economically eﬃcient than
their nonrelated competitors. In order to test this hypothesis, we employ a
Cox maximum-likelihood proportional hazards model to estimate the ef-
fect of bank relation on the probability of mill failure. Mills are deﬁned as
“failed” when they disappeared from the subsequent census, never to reap-
pear. All coeﬃcients (and standard errors) are transformed into hazard
rates.
Our ﬁndings, presented in table 6.10, are not consistent with the hy-
pothesis that bank-related mills were less economically eﬃcient. In fact, we
ﬁnd exactly the opposite: bank-related mills were only 23 percent as likely
to fail as their nonrelated competitors. This result is robust to the addition
of conditioning variables for mill size, labor productivity, and age.
The Cox hazard model also suggests that being big was endogenous to
being bank related. Bank-related ﬁrms lived longer and therefore grew
larger. This is consistent with our ﬁnding—that bank-related mills grew
much faster than their competitors (reported in table 6.7).
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Table 6.9 Weighted labor productivity, by mill type
Output per worker (1900 pesos)
Nonrelated Bank-related Diﬀerence (%)
1893 991 1,049 6
1895 1,243 1,266 2
1896 1,204 1,201 0
1912 1,371 1,403 2
1913 1,384 1,373 –1
Source: See table 6.1.6.5.3 Relative Returns
A dedicated skeptic might argue that although there is no evidence that
bank-related mills were less eﬃcient than other mills, the textile sector as
a whole might have been less proﬁtable than other sectors of the economy.
From the available evidence, however, this seems unlikely. An investor
who purchased shares in a comprehensive sample of Mexican manufac-
turing stocks (excluding textiles) would have earned a real return of only
3.3 percent between 1902 and 1910 (Haber 1989, 120). A similar sample
of mining stocks available on the Mexico City stock exchange would have
lost money between 1902 and 1910, returning an average real return of –
5.9 percent. (This calculation includes mining stocks that paid high divi-
dends for a few years and then disappeared, as beﬁts a bonanza industry
like mining.)33 Railroads did little better: all of the major trunk lines lost
money during the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century at annual rates
ranging between –0.3 percent and –2.2 percent (Maurer 2002, 105). In
short, it seems diﬃcult to argue that related lending caused overinvest-
ment in cotton textiles, as compared to other industries for which we have
data.
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Table 6.10 Cox proportional hazard model
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
No. of observations 467 431 275 271
Prob >  2 0 0 0.0001 0.0004
Bank-related dummy 0.23∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(–3.96) (–2.53) (–2.62) (–2.45)
ln (installed spindlage)—Proxy for size 0.59∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.66∗
(–3.92) (–2.06) (–1.76)
ln (output per worker)—Real value 0.89 0.92
(–0.49) (–0.36)
Age of mill 0.98
(–1.25)
Source: See table 6.1.
Notes: Dependent variable   1 if survive, 0 if fail. T-statistics in parenthesis. When coeﬃ-
cients are transformed into hazard rates they represent the eﬀect that the independent vari-
able has on the mill failing. The smaller the coeﬃcient, the greater the independent variable’s
impact. For example, a coeﬃcient of 0.23 on the bank connection dummy means that a bank-
connected mill has a 23 percent chance of failing in any given period compared to an inde-
pendent mill. Output per worker data adjusted for changes in length of legal workday.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 99 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 90 percent level.
33. Calculated from stock prices and dividend coupons published in Economista Mexicano.6.5.4 Related Lending and Market Structure
If bank-related ﬁrms grew at a much faster rate than their nonrelated
competitors, then it logically follows that there should have been big size
diﬀerences between bank-related and nonrelated mills. Table 6.11 is un-
ambiguous on this point: in 1888, bank-related mills were, on average, al-
most twice the size of unrelated mills; by 1913, they were nearly four times
as large.
If bank-related mills were larger than nonrelated mills, then it logically
follows that the market structure of the textile industry became more con-
centrated as the proportion of bank-related mills grew. In order to measure
concentration, we aggregate mills into ﬁrms, and estimate four-ﬁrm con-
centration ratios and the Herﬁndahl index.
In order to determine how low concentration would have been in the ab-
sence of related lending, we specify three counterfactuals. The ﬁrst compares
Mexico to itself over time. Constant returns to scale and the absence of en-
try barriers characterized cotton textile manufacturing. We should expect
that, in the absence of related lending, concentration should have fallen as
the industry grew. The second compares Mexico to countries that had large
textile industries but that did not have Mexico’s banking system. We focus on
the United States, Brazil, and India (Haber 1991, 1997, 2003). The third, fol-
lowing Sutton, compares the Mexican textile industry’s actual market struc-
ture to a hypothetical fully-competitive industry, in which the market struc-
ture was a function solely of industry size and a stochastic growth process.34
The results of all three experiments, displayed in table 6.12, indicate that
the Mexican cotton textile industry was too concentrated. First, concen-
tration in Mexico actually increased over time, even though the industry
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Table 6.11 Average textile mill size (in spindles), by mill type
Nonrelated mills Bank-related mills Size ratio (bank related/nonrelated)
1888 2,549 4,611 181%
1893 2,320 5,467 236%
1895 2,759 6,711 243%
1896 2,862 6,417 224%
1912 2,303 8,725 379%
1913 2,234 8,680 389%
Source: See table 6.1.
34. The method assumes that all ﬁrms in a market have an identical chance of gaining or
losing market share over time. Even under perfect competition, therefore, ﬁrms will have un-
equal market shares in equilibrium, but the market share of the largest ﬁrms will solely be a
function of the number of ﬁrms in the industry and a stochastic growth process (see Sutton
1998).was growing quickly (in the United States, brazil, and India, concentration
fell or remained stable as the textile industry grew). Second, the Mexican
cotton textile industry was much more concentrated than the U.S., Brazil-
ian, or Indian cotton textile industry. Third, the Mexican cotton textile in-
dustry showed much higher four-ﬁrm ratios compared to the ratio that
would be expected in a perfectly competitive market, given the number of
ﬁrms in the industry.
We note that even though Mexico’s textile industry was concentrated by
world standards, the industry did not depart very far from perfect compe-
tition. The four-ﬁrm ratio never exceeded 38 percent, and the number of
ﬁrms hovered around 110. It is hard to believe that this level of concentra-
tion was suﬃcient to allow even the largest ﬁrms to exercise market power.
This interpretation is consistent with the historical evidence about ﬁrm be-
havior during this period.35
6.6 Conclusions and Implications
We argue, based on a study of a banking system characterized by wide-
spread related lending, that there is no necessary connection between re-
lated lending and looting. We also argue that there is no necessary connec-
tion between related lending and a misallocation of capital. Mexican bank-
ers during the Porﬁriato did not choose to lend to ﬁrms that were system-
atically less productive than their competitors.
We also argue that related lending is not a consequence of inadequate
regulation and supervision, but rather is a rational response to high levels
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Table 6.12 Industrial concentration in cotton textiles: Mexico, Brazil, India, and the 
United States
Four ﬁrm ratio (%)
Herﬁndahl index
Mexico United 
Circa Mexico expected Brazil India States Mexico Brazil India
1888 18 19 37 8 0.022 0.058
1891 20 19 0.020
1893 29 15 0.038
1895 33 17 35 0.042 0.059
1896 30 16 0.041
1900 30 14 19 7 0.038 0.028 0.018
1904 33 15 21 0.042
1912 30 14 19 8 0.039 0.018
1913 31 14 14 0.041 0.014
Sources: For Mexico, see table 6.1; for Brazil, Haber 1997; for India and the United States, Haber 2003.
35. See Haber 1989, 94–95, and Gómez-Galvarriato 1999.of default risk. High levels of default risk can exist for any number of rea-
sons, but prominent among them are weak institutions to enforce contract
rights and high costs of obtaining information about potential borrowers.
Related lending mitigates these problems. First, bankers do not need re-
course to the formal legal system to sanction related borrowers. Rather,
they can do so through a wide variety of informal means. Second, bankers
can obtain information about related borrowers at relatively low cost.
It logically follows that attempts to eliminate related lending through su-
pervision and regulation will not produce the ﬁrst-best outcome of arm’s-
length lending based on objective performance criteria. Rather, in the con-
text of high default risk, the close regulation and supervision of banks so
as to preclude related lending will produce very little lending of any type.
The canonical case of this phenomenon also comes from Mexico, where
regulators have been quite eﬀective in curtailing related lending since a se-
ries of accounting and regulatory reforms in 1997. The response of Mex-
ico’s banks has been to drastically curtail private lending, shifting their as-
sets into corporate and government securities, as well as loans to states and
municipalities (Haber and Musacchio 2004).
Unfortunately, the institutional problems that give rise to high levels of
default risk (weak property rights and high costs of information) cannot
be reformed at the stroke of a pen. Enhancing the enforcement of contract
rights requires, in the ﬁrst place, that governments actually have the ca-
pacity to adjudicate and enforce those rights. This requires more than the
power of coercion. It requires that the government has an eﬃcient ad-
ministrative apparatus that can adjudicate disputes at low cost to the con-
tracting parties.36 The capacity to enforce contracts is, however, only half
the battle. As a large literature in economic history and political science
has demonstrated, any government that has the power to eﬀectively adju-
dicate contract rights also has the power to abrogate or selectively enforce
them. Thus, the eﬀective enforcement of contract rights also requires that
there be self-enforcing political institutions that limit the authority and
discretion of public oﬃcials.37 To argue, therefore, that governments can
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36. If the cost of adjudication to the parties is high, then economic agents will only make
contracts whose rate of return exceeds the cost of contract enforcement. This will curtail the
number of contracts into which agents enter, and thereby depress economic activity.
37. Constraints on public oﬃcials and government capacity are causally linked. If the
power of public oﬃcials is not limited, economic agents will be subject to expropriation risk.
They will therefore refrain from investments whose rate of return does not compensate them
for expropriation risk. The result will be lower levels of investment, which, in turn, will reduce
the pool of wealth and income that the government can tax. With fewer resources, the gov-
ernment will be less able to develop an eﬀective administrative and coercive apparatus that
can adjudicate property rights. This fundamental dilemma of governance was noted as long
ago as the Middle Ages (Greif et al. 1994), but in recent years it has spawned a sizable politi-
cal science literature. For representative works see: North and Weingast 1989; Shepsle 1991;
Hoﬀman and Norberg 1994; McGuire and Olson 1996; Weingast 1997a, 1997b; North et al.
2000; Olson 2000; Bates 2001; Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003.enhance property rights enforcement at the stroke of a pen is to engage in
a nirvana thesis.
Related lending need not, however, be economically ineﬃcient. Three
conditions appear to be necessary to prevent related lending from turning
into organized looting. First, the banks must be well-capitalized. In our
case, for example, the capital asset ratios were four times the levels recom-
mended by Basel. Second, bank directors must own substantial equity
shares in their own banks. This gives bank directors incentives to monitor
one another. Third, outside shareholders must have their own money at
risk, and depositors must not be fully insured. This gives depositors and
outside shareholders incentives to monitor the activities of the directors.
We note that the results we obtained for the Mexican case are consistent
with those of other cases—particularly, contemporary India.38 They are
also consistent with the results obtained in historical case studies of the
nineteenth-century United States and continental Europe.39 We would
submit, therefore, that more research is needed into the causes and conse-
quences of related lending before academics and public oﬃcials embrace
any particular set of policy recommendations.
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